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UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCYv.
MONTGOMERY: PAVING A NEW PATH TO
CONVICTION IN OLYMPIC DOPING CASES
Paul Greene·
I. INTRODUCTION

In United States Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, 1 a Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) 2 Tribunal found Olympic track and field gold medalist' and former world
record holder 4 Tim Montgomery (Montgomery) guilty of doping. 5 The Tribunal

• J.D. Candidate, 2007, University ofMaine School of Law. The author would like to thank his wife,
Julie, for her boundless support in making the publication of this Note possible.
I. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005),
(follow "Arbitration Ruling:
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under
''2005") [hereinafter Montgomery, award on merits]. Montgomery was heard and decided concurrently
with U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Gaines, which involved an American female sprinter, Chryste Gaines,
who was also found to be guilty of doping by the CAS without ever testing positive for a banned substance.
See CAS 2004/0/649 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/
management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling: U.S. Track & Field Athlete Chryste Gaines
Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under "2005").
2. The CAS is based in Lausanne, Switzerland, but this case and its preliminary hearings were heard
in San Francisco and Montreal by a three-member panel comprised ofL. Yves Fortier of Montreal, Canada,
Christopher Campbell of San Francisco, United States, and Peter Leaver of London, United Kingdom.
Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 8.
3. Montgomery won a gold medal at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia as a member of Team
USA's 4xl 00 meter relay. Tim Montgomery-Biography, http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/Montgomery _
Tim.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
4. Montgomery set a world record in the I 00 meter-dash by running 9. 78 seconds on the track in Paris
in 2002. Id.
5. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 24. Two attorneys for Montgomery, Robert
W. McFarland and Amy Morrissey Turk, of the Norfolk, Virginia law firm McGuire Woods LLP, appealed
the Tribunal's decision on January 21, 2006 through a letter. to the CAS Secretary-General Matthieu Reeb
seeking to have it annulled on the grounds that one of the arbitrators had a conflict of interest.
Montgomery's Attorneys Mull Court Action Over Conflict-of-Interest Claim, THEHERALD-SUN(Durham,
N.C.), Jan. 21, 2006, at B3 [hereinafter Attorneys Mull Court Action]. Montgomery's lawyers allege that
L. Yves Fortier's Montreal law firm, Ogilvy Renault, also represents the Montreal-based World AntiDoping Agency (WADA). Id. Specifically, it is alleged that the clerk working for the Tribunal, Stephen
Drymer, Fortier's law firm partner, is the WAD A's attorney. Id. The letter called the alleged conflict of
interest "egregious" and called into question the integrity and impartiality of the proceeding. Sprinter
Appeals Ban, SPORTAL, Jan. 21, 2006, http://loudytourky.sportal.com.au/othersports.asp?i=news&id=76685
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006). Secretary-General Reeb rejected the appeal, saying it was wrongly directed
to the CAS. Id. Reeb said Switzerland's highest court, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, is the only body with
jurisdiction to consider a CAS decision. Id. Montgomery's attorneys indicated that Montgomery is
considering such an appeal to Switzerland's highest court, as well as one to the United States Federal
Courts. Id If the Tribunal's ruling was overturned, the CAS could opt to try Montgomery again. Attorneys
Mull Court Action, supra. The appeal of the CAS Tribunal's decision, however, appears to have taken a
back seat for Montgomery and his attorneys to more pressing legal problems for the former Olympic
NEWS,May 4, 2006,
champion. Ovidiu Panzariu, Montgomery Says NO to Fraud Accusations, SOFTPEDIA
(last visited
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Montgomery-Says-NO-to-Fraud-Accusations-22756.shtml
Sept. 29, 2006). In April 2006, Montgomery was arrested on charges that he had participated in a
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determined, after considering the evidence presented by the United States Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA), that Montgomery had taken THG,6 a prohibited performanceenhancing drug known in colloquial parlance as "the Clear." 7 As punishment,
Montgomery was banned from competition for two years, stripped of his on-track
achievements dating back to March 200 l, and ordered to repay an estimated $1 million
in earnings. 8
Montgomery is an extraordinary case because Montgomery was found guilty of
using THG without ever testing positive for the drug in an in-competition or out-ofcompetition drug test. 9 Thus, the Tribunal's finding dramatically altered the landscape
for Olympic athletes who face charges that they took a banned performance-enhancing
substance. Historically, the bright line evidentiary rule has required an Olympic athlete
to test positive for a banned substance in an officially administered drug test before he
or she could be found guilty of doping. The Montgomery decision eradicated this rule
and established that an athlete could be found guilty of doping without evidence of a
positive drug test.
In rendering its verdict, the Montgomery Tribunal relied heavily upon United
States Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, 10 a December 2004 decision by a North
American Court of Arbitration for Sport (NAS) Panel. Collins was the only previous
instance in which an athlete charged with doping by the US ADA had been found guilty
without evidence of a positive drug test, known in Olympic circles as an "analytical
positive." 11 The CAS is the "Supreme Court" of Olympic issues and the NAS is a
lower court subject to CAS review; 12 therefore, the Collins Panel's landmark decision
did not carry precedential weight worldwide until the Montgomery Tribunal reiterated
its holding. 13 Now that a CAS Tribunal has provided its stamp of approval to the idea

multimillion-dollar bank fraud and money-laundering scheme that also involved his coach Steven Riddick.
Fastest
Man Busted
in Fraud,
CBS
NEWS, Apr.
28,
2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/28/sportsline/main 1560120.shtml [hereinafter Busted in Fraud]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006). Montgomery pleaded "not guilty" to the charges before a federal court in
Manhattan, New York. Panzariu, supra. Specifically, prosecutors have charged that Montgomery was paid
$20,000 for depositing nearly $1 million in bogus checks. Busted in Fraud, supra.
6. THG or''the Clear" is a designer steroid that was undetectable in anti-doping tests until 2003, when
a track and field coach provided a sample to the USADA. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS
2004/0/645, at I. The steroid was created and distributed to athletes in various sports by San Franciscobased BALCO. Id.
1. Id.
8. Id.; see also Montgomery Retires in Wake of 2-year Doping Ban, ABC NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/ESPNSports/story?id= 1407042 [hereinafter Montgomery Retires] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2006).
9. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at I.
10. AAA No. 301900065804 (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx
(follow "Former World Champion Collins
Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug Conspiracy" hyperlink under "2004").
11. Id. at I. Michelle Collins, a gold medalist in the 200-meter dash at the 2003 World Indoor Track
and Field Championship, was suspended for eight years by the NAS after being found guilty of doping.
Id. at 7, 29.
12. For an overview of Olympic doping adjudication, see infra Table I.
13. AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
AsSOCIATIONSUPPLEMENT
ARYPROCEDURES
FORTHEARBITRATION
OF
OLYMPICSPORTDOPINGDISPUTESR-49A (2004), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627. The
pertinent language that allows for appeal of a ruling by the NAS to the CAS is:

Ex-World's
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that an Olympic athlete can be found guilty of doping without testing positive for a
banned substance, a new path to conviction has been paved for Olympic prosecuting
agencies like the USADA. The question now becomes: Was Montgomery decided
correctly? Also, how will it alter the legal landscape and affect future Olympic doping
cases?
This Note explains how the CAS and the USADA emerged to become prominent
players in the world of Olympic dopingjurisprudence. Furthermore, this Note explores
the determination made by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) that CAS
Olympic doping hearings should be regarded as quasi-criminal with a burden of proof
that lies somewhere between the civil and criminal standard. 14 Specifically, the
WADA adopted a "comfortable satisfaction of the relevant hearing body" standard in
the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), a prosecutorial burden described as "greater
than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 15
Finally, this Note analyzes the Montgomery decision by examining the approach used
by the CAS Tribunal to determine whether Montgomery was afforded sufficient due
process before being found guilty of doping. The case will no doubt carry enormous
precedential weight; thus, the right to a fair hearing for future Olympic athletes accused
of doping in "non-analytical positive" cases is also at stake.
Ultimately, this Note does not support the Tribunal's decision in Montgomery
because it wrongly characterized the proceeding as civil instead of quasi-criminal.
This error led to a series of missteps that resulted in Montgomery being unfairly
penalized because he was not accorded a fair hearing. First, the Tribunal failed to
settle on an applicable burden of proof, deciding that it did not matter whether a quasicriminal or criminal standard was used because, in the Tribunal's words, there is no
"great gulfbetween proofin civil and criminal matters." 16 Next, the Tribunal deemed
it appropriate to regard Montgomery's alleged confession alone as sufficient proof of
his guilt, something that should never happen in either a criminal or quasi-criminal
proceeding. The determination, wholly without precedent, defied the approach taken
in Collins, in which the Panel required the USADA to present a myriad of
corroborating evidence before finding Collins guilty of doping. 17 Finally, the Tribunal
wrongly drew an adverse inference from Montgomery's decision not to testify. This
conclusion compounded the error made in Collins, where the Panel determined that it
was proper to draw an adverse inference from an American athlete's decision to invoke
the Fifth Amendment and not testify. In sum, the Tribunal's finding in Montgomery

The arbitration award may be appealed to [the] CAS as provided in Annex A of the USADA
Protocol .... Appeals to [the] CAS filed under these rules shall be heard in the United
States. The decisions of[the] CAS shall be final and binding on all parties and shall not be
subject to any further review or appeal ....
Id. (emphasis omitted).
14. WORLD ANTI-DoPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 12 (2003), available at
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_ v3.pdf [hereinafter WADA ANTI-DoPINGCODE].
15. Id.
16. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 13 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005),
(follow "Arbitration Ruling:
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under
"2005").
17. See Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 25.
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was incorrect because Montgomery was not afforded the due process appropriate to
a quasi-criminal proceeding.
In the haste to clean up Olympic sports and combat the perception that many
athletes competing are "dirty," the CAS must carefully consider how the reasoning that
led to a guilty verdict in the Montgomery case could lead to the unjust conviction of
athletes in future non-analytical positive cases. The CAS must establish proper
procedural safeguards for this kind of Olympic doping proceeding. In Montgomery,
the Tribunal failed to establish the right blueprint.
This Note proposes that future CAS Tribunals reconsider the stances the
Montgomery Tribunal adopted that permit an adverse inference to be drawn from an
athlete's decision not to testify, and allow an athlete to be convicted solely on evidence
of an alleged confession. Olympic doping proceedings should not be viewed as private
civil arbitrations, but rather as private quasi-criminal arbitrations, which afford athletes
safeguards that are somewhat analogous to criminal trials. In short, the CAS should
adopt standards that will cause its Olympic doping hearings to more closely resemble
criminal proceedings than civil ones. A "conviction" in such a setting, while not
"criminal" in the literal sense of the word, essentially amounts to one in the world of
Olympic sports, and before athletes are labeled "dopers" they should be accorded
proper due process.
At stake is the credibility of the still fledgling CAS. The world watches,
wondering: can the CAS emerge as a global body with true worldwide respect apt to
handle Olympic doping cases with an avowed air of neutrality? If the CAS is seen as
nothing more than a shill for prosecuting agencies like the USADA, the current system
of Olympic doping jurisprudence is doomed to fail.

II. THEROAD

TO UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY

A. The CAS is Created to Bring Uniformity to Olympic Jurisprudence
The CAS was established in 1983 at a time when much of the jurisprudence
surrounding the Olympic movement was uncertain and inconsistent. 18 In founding the
CAS, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) hoped to fill a much-needed
jurisdictional void in international sports by creating an "ultimate, authoritative and
neutral solution to judicial disputes" that would bring uniformity to the Olympic
arena. 19 In the more than two decades since the CAS was established, however, it has
struggled to become the "Supreme Court" of Olympic sports that the IOC envisioned.
The development of the CAS into a true worldwide, impartial purveyor of justice
has been stunted chiefly for two reasons. First, international governing bodies like the
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), which oversees track and field,
have been reluctant to surrender the jurisdiction they have historically enjoyed over

18. Cf Richard H. McLaren, Sports Law Arbitration by CAS: Is it the Same as International
Arbitration?, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 101, JOI (2001) (discussing the emergence of the CAS and comparing it
favorably to other bodies that conduct international arbitrations).
19. Id.
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matters involving their athletes. 20 Second, the CAS has been hampered by a perception
that it is too closely connected to the IOC, the WADA, and the international governing
bodies. 21 While the CAS has made great strides toward overcoming the first hurdle by
wrestling jurisdiction away from the international governing bodies, the CAS is still
22
struggling to shake the doubts many have about its ability to be neutral. Athletes and
their lawyers continue to openly question the objectivity of CAS (and NAS)
arbitrators. 23
B. The IAAF Hands the CAS its Jurisdictional Reigns

In August 200 I, the IAAF surrendered jurisdiction over issues arising in the track
and field arena to the CAS.24 The transfer of power gave the CAS and its arbitrators
25
authority to hear doping cases that involved track and field athletes worldwide. At
roughly the same time, in 1999 and 2000, respectively, the WADA and the USADA
were established to create and enforce a uniform doping code to be used in CAS and
NAS hearings. 26 The World Anti-Doping Code (W ADC), written by the WADA, was
unveiled in 2004, ensuring "for the first time, the rules and regulations governing antidoping are the same across all sports ... :m Each governing body, like the IAAF,
adopted the W ADC in its doping proceedings before the CAS to create uniformity

20. The IAAF created an arbitration panel in 1982 to handle doping cases internally and remained the
final and binding authority over cases involving track and field athletes for nearly two decades. Id. at I 02.
21. Cf Michael S. Straube), Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in
International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523,541 (2002) (describing the CAS prior to 1993, a period when
it was funded entirely by the IOC and was based in the IOC's headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland).
22. Brendan I. Koerner, Where Do Athletes Go to Court? Why, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport,
(last visited Sept. 29,
of Course, SLATE,July I, 2004, http://www.slate.com/Default.aspx?id=2l03285
2006). Specifically, Koerner writes:
Though the CAS has been ostensibly independent of the IOC since 1994, there are some
athletes who grumble that the court is too biased in favor of the Olympics' management.
They point out that many members of the ICAS [International Council of Arbitration for
Sport], who select the [CAS) arbitrators, are members of either the IOC or the Association
of National Olympic Committees.
Id.
In an effort to make it a truly independent body, the CAS underwent a major reform in 1994 after the
Swiss Federal Tribunal opined that it was too closely tied to the IOC. Matthieu Reeb, The Court of
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006).
Arbitration for Sport, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/histoire/histoireA.htrn
Control of the CAS was transferred from the IOC to the newly created, more independent, ICAS. Id. Frank
Shorter, Chairman of the USADA from 2000-2003 and a gold (1972) and silver (1976) Olympic medalist
in the men's marathon, holds a contrary view when it comes to the independence of the current pool ofNAS
and CAS arbitrators. Frank Shorter, Op-Ed, Maintaining Standards is Role of Anti-Doping Agency, S.F.
CHRON., July 30, 2004, at B9. Shorter writes, "[t]he hearing is before an independent panel that is selected
from an independent pool of people from North America. It is intentionally set up so that these arbitrators
have no connections with [the] USADA, except a willingness to give their time, effort and expertise." Id.
23. See, e.g., Koerner, supra note 22.
24. Straube), supra note 21, at 560.
25. See id.
26. Richard W. Pound, Chairman of the World Anti-Doping Agency, Chairman's Message,
(last visited Sept. 29, 2006); Straube),
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=237
supra note 21, at 559 (referring to the "birth" of the USADA on October I, 2000).
27. Id.
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across the spectrum of Olympic sports. The American governing bodies, like USA
Track and Field (USATF), directed by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC),
adopted the WADC and empowered the USADA to become its prosecutorial arm in
doping cases before the CAS and the NAS. 28
As a consequence, the burden of proof was lowered in doping proceedings that
implicated track and field athletes. 29 The IAAF (and USATF) had previously
maintained a criminal burden of proof in doping hearings, but after the implementation
of the WADC prosecuting agencies, like the USADA, had to meet only a quasicriminal burden to convince a CAS Tribunal that an athlete was guilty of doping. 30
The WADA concluded that a quasi-criminal burden of proof was appropriate after
determining that criminal procedural guarantees were not necessary for doping disputes
taking place before a private sports governing body. 31 NAS and CAS Tribunals would
thus have to be convinced by prosecuting agencies like the USADA only to their
"comfortable satisfaction" that a track and field athlete had taken a banned
performance-enhancing substance. 32
C. Quasi-Criminal Standards Are Established for Olympic Doping Cases

The WADA based this determination upon the position taken by Switzerland's
highest court, the Swiss Federal Tribunal, as it reviewed a series ofCAS decisions in
the 1990s.33 The Swiss Federal Tribunal maintains a unique position of authority in
Olympic jurisprudence as the only court with the power to review a CAS decision. 34
The position, adopted by the WADA, is that the "procedural guarantees that
international (and national) human rights instruments afford in criminal matters" are
not applicable to cases that involve doping sanctions, because such hearings are
"private rather than criminal in nature." 35 The WADA accordingly deemed a burden

28. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645, at 2 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb. 9,
2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx(follow "Arbitration
Ruling: CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under
"2005") [hereinafterMontgomery, award onjurisdiction). See generally Straubel,supra note 21, at 558-62.
29. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 12 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx(follow "Arbitration Ruling:
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under
"2005").
30. Id.
31. WORLD
ANTI-DOPING
AGENCY,
LEGALOPINION
ONTHECONFORMITY
OFCERTAIN
PROVISIONS
OF
THEDRAFTWORLD
ANTI-DOPING
CODEWITHCOMMONLY
ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES
OFINTERNATIONAL
LAW
19-20 (2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/kaufmann-kohler-full.pdf
[hereinafter WADA LEGALOPINION].
32. WADA ANTI-DOPING
CODE,supra note 14, at 12.
33. WADA LEGALOPINION,
supra note 31, at 19-20.
34. Id. at 19-20. See Tribunal federal suisse [Federal Tribunal] Mar. 15, 1993, 119 Arrets du Tribunal
Federal Suisse [Official Digest of Federal Tribunal Judgments] 271 (Switz.) (holding that sanctions by
sports federations are private rather than criminal in nature, and that such private law matters cannot be
resolved "in the light of notions proper to criminal law"). The Gunde/ case effectively allowed the CAS
to become a worldwide player, because Switzerland's highest court formally recognized the legitimacyof
its decisions. See Stephen A. Kaufman, Note, Issues in International Sports Arbitration, 13 B.U. INT'LL.J.
527, 541-42 (1995).
35. Id. at 19.
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of proof that "is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt" most appropriate for CAS doping hearings. 36
A leading scholar on the CAS, Professor Michael Straubel, 37 opines that the
unstated rationale behind this decision was a desire to combat the image that athletes
taking performance-enhancing drugs were hijacking the Olympic movement.38
Straube( points to a series of doping scandals that threatened to taint the public's
impression of Olympic sports and seriously curtail Olympic sponsorship money in the
late 1990s.39 Most notable among these was the indignity of the 1998 Tour de France,
when several cyclists tested positive for banned substances. 40 Straube( cautions that
athletes accused of doping must be accorded fair hearings for the CAS to demonstrate
that it is indeed a neutral third party uninfluenced by the Olympic establishment. 41
Straube! has suggested that the burden of proof in doping cases "should be more
like that used in criminal cases." 42 The CAS needs to clearly define, writes Straube(,
precisely where the comfortable satisfaction standard falls between the criminal and
civil standards of proof. 43 The question remains, writes Straube!, "[i]s proof to a
comfortable satisfaction closer to proof beyond a reasonable doubt because doping
cases are at the least quasi-criminal in nature? Or, is proof to a comfortable
satisfaction closer to the preponderance of the evidence standard because doping cases
are private in nature?'..w
D. The USADA Emerges as the Prosecuting Arm of the USOC

The USADA has not lost a single case since it began prosecuting American
Olympic athletes for alleged doping violations in 2002. 45 Until December 2004, and

36. WADAANTI-OOPINGCODE,supranote 14,at 12.
37. Michael S. Straube) is an Associate Professor at Valparaiso University School of Law and
Valparaiso's Head Cross Country and Assistant Track Coach. In addition, Straubel is the Director of the
Sports Law Clinic at Valparaiso that provides free legal help to athletes, coaches, and others involved in
amateur sports. The clinic is currently representing Olympic and amateur athletes in cases involving
doping, eligibility, and immigration issues. See http://www.valpo.edu/law/sportsclinic/legalclinic.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2006).
38. Straube), supra note 21, at 555.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 525-26.
42. Michael S. Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1272 (2005).
43. Id. at 1268-69.
44. Id. Legal scholars believe that the Australian Supreme Court, searching for the appropriate standard
to be used in a divorce proceeding, may have been the first to utilize the "comfortable satisfaction" standard
of proof. Id. at 1266-67. Interestingly, the Australian courts have deemed it inappropriate to use the
comfortable satisfaction standard in criminal or quasi-criminal cases, perhaps a signal that it is not the
proper standard to be used in doping cases. Id. at 1267.
45. Telephone Interview with Michael S. Straube!, Associate Professor, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law
and Head Cross Country Coach and Assistant Track Coach, Valparaiso Univ., in Valparaiso, Ind. (Mar. I 0,
2006). See generally http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx
(listing all of the
arbitration rulings involving the USADA as prosecuting authority since 2002). The USADA's authority
to prosecute athletes and compel them to submit to mandatory binding arbitration comes from the USOC
and its bylaws. See Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb.
9, 2005), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration
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the finding by an NAS Panel that Michelle Collins was guilty of doping in a "nonanalytical positive" case, each of the USADA's victories followed the traditional
script. 46 An athlete would test positive for a banned substance in an in-competition or
out-of-competition drug test, and be charged by the USADA with a doping violation.
The athlete would then be tried before an NAS or CAS Tribunal who, after considering
evidence of the positive drug test, would invariably find the athlete guilty as charged.
These cases presented straightforward evidentiary issues for Tribunals because an
analytical positive, under the strict liability standard followed by the NAS and the
47
CAS, would alone provide sufficient evidence of the athlete's guilt. The NAS has,
in fact, established that the USADA "need only show the presence of a prohibited
48
substance in an athlete's sample to prove a doping offense."
The case against Michelle Collins marked an aggressive new chapter in the
USADA's pursuit of prohibited drug use by American Olympic athletes. In Collins,
the USADA sought for the first time to sanction an athlete who had never tested
49
positive for a banned substance in an in-competition or out-of-competition drug test.
Thus, the NAS Tribunal that heard Collins was presented with a landmark evidentiary
question: how could the USADA demonstrate there was sufficient evidence to prove
its case without evidence of a positive drug test? In its opinion, the three-member
panel acknowledged the ground breaking nature of the case when it wrote, the
"USADA seeks for the first time to sanction an athlete [Michelle Collins] who has not
tested positive in any of her in-competition or out-of-competition drug tests. Thus ...

Ruling: CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under
"2005"). The USOC has jurisdiction over all American Olympic athletes through the Amateur Sports Act
(ASA), passed by Congress in 1978. See Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory Binding Arbitration
For Olympic Athletes: ls the Process Better Or Worse For "Job Security"?, 25 FLA.ST. U. L. REV. 655,
657, 672 ( 1998) ( critiquing the mandatory arbitration process, and calling on the CAS to "protect the rights
of the athletes and to address the need for fair and efficient resolution of disputes."). In the ASA, Congress
gave the USOC "exclusive jurisdiction ... over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United
States in the Olympic Games." Id. at 657. A clause in the contract that athletes sign to represent the United
States in Olympic competitions compels them to submit to mandatory binding arbitration before either the
NAS or the CAS. Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6. This clause, which keeps
doping cases out of the federal courts, was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Federation. 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001). In Slaney,
the court held that "Slaney participated in a valid arbitration ... [that] we are obligated to recognize. Thus, _
the issue decided in that arbitration cannot be relitigated .... [T]he district court correctly determined that
it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. at 601;seealso Jacobs v. USA Track and Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d
Cir. 2004) (reiterating the USADA's authority by finding that the USADA's rules were valid in doping
cases brought before the NAS and by upholding the district court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction). See
generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2005) (giving the federal courts the power to uphold all
valid arbitrations that the two sides agree to submit to in advance).
46. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at I (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for Sport
(follow
Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx
"Former World Champion Collins Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug
Conspiracy'' hyperlink under "2004").
4 7. The CAS has adopted a "pure strict liability" standard for cases that involve a positive drug test.
Straube!, supra note 42, at 1262. Under this standard, "any question of fault, intent, or negligence is
irrelevant: an athlete may not avoid a sanction by showing an absence of fault." Id.
48. Id. at 1265.
49. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at I.
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the case involves issues that have not previously had to be decided by Arbitral
Tribunals." 50 The Panel, however, did not regard the novel nature of the proceeding
as a bar to conviction, finding that "the straightforward application oflegal principles"
led to a clear resolution of the matter. 51
The Panel applied the criminal standard of proof when considering the evidence
presented by the USADA because Collins's alleged doping offenses occurred prior to
the IAAF's adoption of the WADC's quasi-criminal standard. 52 The burden of proof
rested with the USADA to "show that Collins intentionally used a prohibited substance
or technique." 53 The Panel determined that the USADA had met its burden of proof
by presenting a variety of convincing evidence. 54 This evidence included: (I) email
exchanges between Collins and Victor Conte, President of the San Francisco-based
Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), which specifically mentioned her use of
banned substances; (2) documents seized from BALCO labeled "Michelle Collins" that
contained shorthand for the banned substances THG and EPO; (3) expert testimony of
the USADA doctors whose analysis ofCollins's blood and urine test results led the
doctors to the conclusion that she was doping; and (4) testimony by Kelli White that
Conte told her directly, among other things, that Collins was using EPO and THG. 55
By basing its finding of guilt on a substantial amount of corroborating evidence, the
Collins Panel established the proper blueprint for this new "non-analytical positive"
category of cases.
Seemingly aware of the precedential nature of the opinion it was crafting, the
Collins Panel addressed one other key procedural issue: was it proper to draw an
adverse inference from an athlete's decision not to testify? 56 The Panel determined that
it was indeed proper for a Tribunal to "draw certain adverse inferences" against an
American athlete who invokes the Fifth Amendment because Olympic doping
proceedings are "civil" in nature. 57 This conclusion was based primarily upon the
Tribunal's interpretation of Baxter v. Pa/migiano, 58 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the "Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against
parties in civil actions ... ."59
The Collins Panel failed to note, however, that the Baxter holding also established
that an adverse inference could not be drawn in a criminal case, where the judge and
prosecutor were prohibited from suggesting that the defendant's silence was
tantamount to evidence of guilt.60 Skirting this part of the Baxter holding, the Collins
Panel found that an adverse inference could be drawn against an American athlete

50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 11-12.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 25-27.
56. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
58. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
59. Id. at 318 (allowing an adverse inference to be drawn in civil actions when a witness refuses "to
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them"); see Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at
14-15; see also Sanders v. Gardner, 7 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)(allowing an arbitral panel
to draw an adverse inference from a witness's refusal to testify).
60. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 318-19.
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because doping proceedings were "civil arbitrations." 61 This characterization, however, would appear to be at odds with both the criminal burden of proofused in Collins
and the W ADA's determination that doping cases should be regarded as quasi62
criminal, with a burden of proof that is "greater than a mere balance of probability. "
Buoyed by the outcome in Collins, the USADA next sought to prosecute Tim
Montgomery for alleged doping violations in the highest profile "non-analytical
positive" case yet. Montgomery would become arguably the most visible name in
track and field to be labeled a "doper" since Ben Johnson was stripped of a gold medal
and world record in the 100-meter dash at the 1988 Olympics. 63 The key difference
is that Johnson tested positive for a banned substance in an in-competition drug test,
while Montgomery never tested positive for a banned substance in an in-competition
or out-of-competition drug test.
III. THE UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY DECISION
In Montgomery, the USADA informed Tim Montgomery through a June 7, 2004
letter that it had received evidence indicating his participation "in a doping conspiracy
64
In a follow-up
involving various elite athletes and coaches as well as BALCO."
with violations
him
charging
formally
was
it
that
Montgomery
letter, the USADA told
of track and field's anti-doping rules: "[The] USADA charges that your participation
in the [BALCO] conspiracy, the purpose of which was to trade in doping substances
and techniques that were either undetectable or difficult to detect in routine testing,
65
involved your violations of ... IAAF Rules that strictly forbid doping. " Specifically,

61. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 14.
CODE,supra note 14, at 12.
62. WADA ANTI-DOPING
63. Frank Litsky, Montgomery is Suspended 2 Yearsfor Steroid Use, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 14, 2005, at
D3. Ben Johnson was stripped ofan Olympic gold medal at the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea after
dashing to a world record time of 9.79 seconds in the I 00 meter-dash. Id. Johnson tested positive for the
anabolic steroid, stanozolol, in the post-race drug test. Id.
64. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 4 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Dec. 13, 2005),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling:
U.S. Track & Field Athlete Tim Montgomery Receives Suspension for Drug Violation" hyperlink under
"2005").
65. Id at 5. Montgomery was accused of violating the following IAAF rules:
Rule 55.2-The offen[s]e of doping takes place when either: (i) a prohibited substance is
present within an athlete's body tissues or fluids; or (ii) an athlete uses or takes advantage
of a prohibited technique; or (iii) an athlete admits having used or taken advantage of a
prohibited substance or a prohibited technique ....
Rule 56.3-Any person assisting or inciting others, or admitting having incited or assisted
others, to use a prohibited substance, or prohibited techniques, shall have committed a
doping offen[s]e and shall be subject to sanctions in accordance with Rule 60 ....
Rule 56.4-Any person trading, trafficking, distributing or selling any prohibited substance
otherwise than in the normal course of a recogni[z]ed profession or trade shall also have
committed a doping offen[s]e under these Rules and shall be subject to sanctions in
accordance with Rule 60.
Rule 60.J-For the purpose of these Rules, the following shall be regarded as "doping
offen[s]es" ... (i) the presence in an athlete's body tissues or fluids of a prohibited
substance; (ii) the use or taking advantage of forbidden techniques; (iii) admitting having
taken advantage of, or having used, or having attempted to use, a prohibited substance or
a prohibited technique ....
Id at 5-6.

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 159 2007

160

MAINE LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 59:1

Montgomery was told that the evidence confirmed his use of Anabolic Steroids,
Testosterone/Epitestosterone Cream, EPO, Growth Hormone, and Insulin.66
The USADA initially told Montgomery that, as punishment, it would seek to
sanction him with a lifetime ban from competition. 67 The agency, however, would later
lower its proposed sanction to a four-year period ofineligibility. 68 The USADA also
sought to retroactively expunge his on-track achievements dating back to February
2000, 69 and recoup the money he had earned during the same period. 70
In response to the charges levied against him, Montgomery notified the USADA
on June 28, 2004 that he would elect to bypass the NAS and proceed directly to the
CAS for a final, binding, non-appealable hearing pursuant to his rights under USA TF
rules. 71 The USADA then submitted its request for arbitration to the CAS on July 5,
2004, identifying Peter Leaver, barrister of London, England, as its party-appointed
arbitrator. 72 Montgomery submitted his answer to the USADA 's arbitration request the
next day, providing a brief statement ofhis defense and naming San Francisco attorney
Christopher Campbell as his party-appointed arbitrator. 73 The two party-appointed
arbitrators then chose L. Yves Fortier, barrister of Montreal, Canada, to serve as
President of the Arbitral Tribunal. 74
Three preliminary hearings were held prior to the final hearing on the merits. 75
First, on November I, 2004, the Tribunal convened with the parties to establish a
timetable which called for a second preliminary hearing to be held in Montreal on
December 15, 2004, to resolve the question of whether the CAS hadjurisdiction. 76 At
the second hearing, Montgomery submitted a motion to dismiss that contended the
CAS lacked jurisdiction and argued the USADA lacked authority to bring the case. 77
Montgomery argued that only USATF, as the agency that governed track and field in

66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. For an Olympian like Montgomery, a four-year ban is tantamount to a lifetime ban. The
USADA was essentially seeking to end Montgomery's career.
68. Id. at n.7.
69. Below are some of Montgomery's on-track achievements since February 2000 that the USADA
sought to retroactively cancel: (I) Montgomery's gold medal performance at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney,
Australia as a member of Team USA's 4x!0O meter relay; (2) a gold medal earned as the anchor leg for
Team USA's 4xl00 meter relay at the 2001 World Outdoor Championships; (3) silver medals won in the
100 meter-dash at the 2001 World Outdoor Championships (where he ran 9.85 seconds) and the 60 meterdash at the World Indoor Championships (where he ran 6.46 seconds); (4) his world record setting run of
9. 78 seconds in the I 00 meter-dash at the 2002 lAAF Grand Prix Final in Paris and subsequent ranking as
the world's top sprinter for 2002 by Track & Field News; and (5) his overall 2002 Grand Prix title. Tim
Montgomery-Biography, http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/Montgomery_ Tim.asp (last visited Sept. 29,
2006).
70. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 6. Montgomery commanded an average of
$40,000 to appear at a meet after setting the world record in 2002. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8.
lAAF rules allow for subsidiary governing bodies, like USA TF, to seek the repayment of appearance and
prize money from athletes banned for doping violations. Id.
71. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10-11.
76. Id. at 11.
77. Id.
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the United States, could charge him with a doping offense in a case where there was
no evidence of a positive drug test. 78 The Tribunal dismissed Montgomery's motion,
affirming both the CAS 's jurisdiction over the matter and the power of the USADA to
charge an athlete in a "non-analytical positive" case. 79 The three-member panel
determined that "[the USADA's] responsibility extends beyond 'drug testing' and
covers all cases of alleged doping violations. It possessed, and possesses, full authority
to prosecute these cases. " 80
A final preliminary hearing was held before the Tribunal in Montreal on February
21, 2005, to address the question of the applicable burden ofproof. 81 Montgomery
argued that it should be the IAAF's long standing criminal standard, while the USADA
argued that it should be the IAAF's newly adopted quasi-criminal standard. 82 The
disagreement stemmed from the IAAF's March 2004 decision to lower its burden of
proof in doping cases against track and field athletes by adopting the W ADC's
"comfortable satisfaction" standard. 83 In the end, the Tribunal sidestepped the issue
by holding that "the debate [over differing standards of proof] looms larger in theory
than practice[,]" reasoning:
[T]here [is not] necessarily a great gulf between proof in civil and criminal matters .
. . . It makes little, if indeed any, difference whether a "beyond [a] reasonable doubt"
or "comfortable satisfaction" standard is applied .... Either way, USADA bears the
burden of proving, by strong evidence commensurate with the serious claims it
makes, that [Montgomery] committed the doping offen[s]es in question. 84

The Tribunal heard the merits in San Francisco from June 6th to 10th 2005. 85
Both parties made oral arguments to the three-member panel and presented evidence
through witness testimony. 86
As the prosecuting agency, the USADA argued that Montgomery was guilty of the
alleged doping offenses by presenting seven types of evidence: (l) February 2000
blood test results analyzed in a Mexican lab that allegedly showed Montgomery's
testosterone level had doubled over the course of one day; (2) BALCO documents
seized by the government; (3) test results reported by IOC-accredited and BALCO
laboratories showing evidence of steroids in Montgomery's urine on fifty-six occasions
between March 1999 and September 2004; (4) allegedly abnormal blood tests on five
occasions between November 2000 and July 2001; (5) Montgomery's alleged
admission to fellow American track athlete Kelli White that he had "used a prohibited
substance known colloquially as 'the Clear"'; (6) statements made by BALCO

78. Montgomery, award on jurisdiction, CAS 2004/0/645, at 5 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport Feb. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow "Arbitration Ruling:
CAS Award on Jurisdiction in Chryste Gaines & Tim Montgomery Proceedings" hyperlink under "2005").
19. Id. at 9.
80. Id.
81. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 11-12.
82. Id. at 12-13.
83. Id. at 12; see also WADA ANTI-DoPING CODE,supra note 14, at 12-13 (outlining the burdens and
standards of proof for Olympic sport doping cases under the WADC).
84. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 13-14.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id
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President Victor Conte to investigative authorities and the media that alluded to
Montgomery's involvement in the BALCO drug scandal; and (7) San Francisco
Chronicle stories reporting that Montgomery had admitted to using various prohibited
substances when he appeared before-a grandjury. 87
In response, Montgomery argued that the evidence presented by the USADA was
unreliable and untruthful. 88 Specifically, Montgomery challenged the statements made
by Victor Conte and Kelli White, and the results of the blood and urine tests analyzed
by non-IOC labs.89
In the end, the Tribunal deemed it unnecessary to determine the veracity of each
type of evidence presented because it found that Montgomery's alleged confession to
Kelli White alone was sufficiently compelling to find him guilty of doping.90 The
Tribunal reasoned that "[d]oping offen[s]es can be proved by a variety of means; and
this is nowhere more true than in 'non-analytical positive' cases such as the present." 91
The Tribunal, apparently applying a criminal and quasi-criminal burden of proof
concurrently to the evidence reasoned it "ha[d] no doubt in this case, and [was] more
than comfortably satisfied that Mr. Montgomery committed the doping offen[s]e in
question." 92
The Tribunal found White's testimony so compelling because she had previously
admitted to doping herself and willingly accepted a two-year ban from competition. 93
The Tribunal believed White to be "honest," "intelligent," "dispassionate," and
''wholly credible. "94 For the Tribunal, the critical component ofWhite's testimony was

87. Id. at 16-17. The USADA dropped all charges against Montgomery during the course of the
proceeding except for the allegation that he had violated lAAF Rule 55.2, which allows for sanctions to be
brought against an athlete who admits to having used a prohibited substance. The USADA focused its case
on this charge aftr.r it became apparent that it would be futile to attempt to prove that Montgomery had
violated the lAAF Rules that prohibit an athlete from "assisting or inciting" and "trafficking" in banned
substances. Id. at 16.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Montgomery Tribunal noted that this decision should in no way be interpreted to mean that
the rest of the evidence presented by the USADA was not credible. The Panel stated, "the fact that [we do]
not consider it necessary in the circumstances to analy[z]e and comment on the mass of other evidence
against the Athlete, however, is not to be taken as an indication that it considers that such other evidence
could not demonstrate that the Respondent is guilty of doping." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 17-18. Kelli White voluntarily testified before the Congressional Committee on Government
Reform less than a week after testifying at the Montgomery hearing to help in the effort to rid sports of
doping. See Eradicating Steroid Use, Part IV: Examining the Use of Steroids by Young Women to
Enhance Athletic Performance and Body Image: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov 't Reform, I 09th
Cong. (2005) (testimony of Ms. Kelli White, former world champion sprinter), available at
http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=28694 (follow ''Testimony of
Ms. Kelli White" hyperlink). In relevant part White's testimony was:
In March of 2003, I made a choice that I will forever regret .... At that time, I began taking
EPO, the clear (or THG), the cream and other stimulants. I remained on this program over
the course of four months, and with the help of Mr. Conte, I was able to pass [seventeen]
drug tests both in and out of competition while utilizing these prohibited performance
enhancing substances.
Id.
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her recounting ofa conversation she had had with Montgomery in March 2001 while
at a track meet in Portugal. 95 According to White, Montgomery asked her, "[d]oes [the
Clear] make your calves tight?" 96 After White had said yes, Montgomery, according
to White, made a phone call to someone White believed was Mr. Conte to whom
Montgomery relayed the information that White had said the Clear made her calves
tight too. 97 According to White, she had no doubt in her mind that she and
Montgomery were talking about a banned performance-enhancing drug. 98
The Tribunal's decision to rely so heavily on Ms. White's testimony was also
influenced by Montgomery's decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment and not testify.
The Tribunal determined that it was proper to "draw an adverse inference from Mr.
Montgomery's refusal to testify" despite arguments by Montgomery that such an
inference was not permitted. 99 The Tribunal reasoned:
It might indeed have affected [our] appreciation of Ms. White's evidence had
Respondent chosen to provide the Panel with a different explanation of their March
2001 conversationor had he denied that the conversation took place as described by
the witness. The fact remains that he did not.... He has had ample opportunity to
deny ever making such statements. But because he has not offered any evidence of
his own concerninghis admission to Ms. White of his use of the Clear, the Panel can
only rely on the testimonyof Ms. White. That testimony is more than merelyadverse
to Mr. Montgomery;it is fatal to his case.100
Ultimately, the Tribunal found Montgomery guilty of violating IAAF anti-doping
rules 55.2(iii) and 60. l(iii). 101 As punishment, Montgomery was banned from
competition for a period of two years commencing on June 6, 2005. 102 Also, the
Tribunal stripped Montgomery of his on-track achievements dating back to March
2001 and ordered him to repay an estimated $1 million in earnings. 103 Among the

95. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 19. Specifically, the Panel believed that it was entitled to draw an adverse inference in this
instance because the "USADA ha[ d] presented evidence that would normally call for a Response from
Respondent himself, and no[t] merely from his experts or counsel." Id.
I 00. Id. at 19-20. Montgomery told Reuters after the decision had been rendered that he had never
knowingly taken a banned substance. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. Montgomery told Reuters that
the CAS had misconstrued White's testimony and maintained that White had told the Panel that she had
been the one to say "[the Clear] made me tight." Id. Montgomery's lawyer, Howard Jacobs, told the same
version of events in the wake of the decision. Jacobs told the French news agency Agence France-Presse
that the Tribunal "took what [White] said and contorted it to say [that] there was an admission. What she
testified [to] was that she asked him if the [C]lear made his calves tight. White never testified that 'Tim
told me the [C]lear made his calves tight."' Litsky, supra note 63. Since the transcript of the hearing and
the briefs submitted by both sides are confidential, what actually transpired remains open to speculation.
IOI. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 20.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 21-22. The panel estimated that March 31, 2001, was the date upon which Montgomery
admitted his use of the Clear to White. Id. The$ I million lost earnings estimate was made by Svein Ame
Hansen, the Director of the Golden League meet in Oslo, Norway. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8.
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records expunged was Montgomery's world record run of9. 78 seconds set in the 100meter dash in 2002. 104
In its conclusion, the Tribunal left little doubt that future CAS Panels would take
the same approach to "non-analytical positive" cases by allowing a prosecuting agency,
like the USADA, to meet its burden of proof in a variety of ways. 105 The Tribunal
embraced the philosophy of the Italian National Olympic Committee, which in a
declaration wrote, "it will be up to the adjudicating body having jurisdiction ... to
determine cas·e by case whether the standard of proof of Article 3.1 of the WADC has
been met and the burden of proof has been discharged, or not, by the prosecuting
sports authority." 106

IV.

UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY V. MONTGOMERY
WAS WRONGLY DECIDED

The CAS Tribunal's decision to declare Montgomery guilty of doping was
incorrect because it prematurely ended his career, expunged his name from the record
books, and ordered him to repay nearly $1 million in earnings without first granting
him the due process appropriate to a quasi-criminal proceeding. The Tribunal made
three critical errors en route to its unfortunate pronouncement. First, the Panel failed
to announce the applicable standard of proof, determining that there was not a "great
gulf between proof in civil and criminal matters." 107 Next, the Panel deemed it
appropriate to convict Montgomery solely on evidence of his alleged confession. 108
Finally, the Panel wrongly labeled the proceeding "civil" and determined that it was
proper to draw an adverse inference from Montgomery's decision to invoke the Fifth
Amendment and not testify. 109
First, the Tribunal erred when it concluded that a prosecutor's evidentiary burden
in a criminal case is not distinguishable from the evidentiary burden required of the
parties in a civil case. This conclusion is highly problematic. How could the Tribunal
say that there is no difference between a criminal and civil standard of proof? A
criminal proceeding is altogether different in its makeup, placing the burden entirely
on the prosecutor to present evidence to a degree that is far more certain than in a civil
matter. The Panel's analysis is further flawed because Olympic doping proceedings
do not even have a civil burden of proof, they have a quasi-criminal one that lies
somewhere between the civil and criminal standards.

I 04. Montgomery Retires, supra note 8. Montgomery retired at the age of 30 on December 14, 2005;
the day after the Tribunal handed down its verdict. Id. Montgomery has made it clear he will not return
the prize money saying, "I deserve every bit of it. ... IfI had tested positive, I would give every penny back .
. . . But someone telling thein I told them somethin~ome
on, this is not high school. They were playing
games with my life." Athletics: Banned U.S.Sprinter Vows to Keep His Prize Money, INT'LHERALDTRIB.,
Dec. I 6, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/16/sports/run.php.
It remains to be seen
whether the USAOA and the IAAF will try to enforce the judgment against Montgomery and go after his
earnings in a subsequent proceeding.
I 05. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 22.
106. Id.
101. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 20.
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Next, the Tribunal went wrong when it detennined that evidence ofMontgomery's
alleged confession alone, conveyed through third party witness testimony, was
sufficient evidence for the USADA to prove his guilt. The decision is entirely without
precedent, and is wholly inconsistent with the reasoning set forth by the NAS Panel in
Collins, where the USADA was required to present a myriad of corroborating evidence
to meet its burden of proof in the first of its kind non-analytical positive case. 110 The
Collins Panel wrote, "[n]one of this evidence by itself would be sufficient to find
doping, but [as a whole] it is consistent with the charges [made by USADA]." 111 The
Tribunal in Montgomery seemed to conveniently ignore this part of the decision in
Collins when it reasoned that Montgomery's alleged confession was alone sufficient
evidence to prove that he was guilty of doping. 112
The Tribunal's determination would even appear to run counter to the W ADA's
conception of how a CAS Olympic doping hearing should proceed. The WADA
proclaimed that doping hearings should amount to more than a civil proceeding when
it established a standard of proof in the WADC that "is greater than a mere balance of
probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 113 Such ·a burden of proof
would seem to indicate that the WADA envisioned a hearing in a non-analytical
positive case where strong corroborating evidence ofan athlete's guilt was required of
an agency before that athlete was found to be a "doper."
Finally, the Montgomery Tribunal blundered by drawing an adverse inference
from Montgomery's decision not to testify, compounding the error made by the Collins
Panel. The Collins Panel concluded that it was appropriate to draw an adverse
inference in an Olympic doping proceeding, basing its decision primarily on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Baxter. 114 The Baxter Court, however, only allowed an adverse inference to be drawn in a civil case, and explicitly established that one
could not be drawn in a criminal case where a judge and prosecutor were not pennitted
to suggest that the defendant's silence was tantamount to evidence of guilt. 115 By
declaring it proper to draw an adverse inference in a quasi-criminal proceeding, the
Collins Panel and the Montgomery Tribunal stretched the Baxter holding beyond its
intended use. The Montgomery Tribunal justified its use of Baxter by characterizing
0 lympic doping proceedings as civil throughout its opinion, but the stark truth combats
this contention: Olympic doping proceedings before the CAS by any measure are not
civil-they are quasi-criminal. Admittedly, there is no guideline for the procedural
safeguards that should exist in quasi-criminal proceedings; however, there should be
a distinct line drawn that separates them from civil proceedings. The drawing of an
adverse inference should not be permitted in any hearing that exceeds the finnly
established parameters of a civil proceeding.

110. See U.S. Anti-DopingAgencyv. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at25 (N. Am. Ct. of Arb. for
Sport Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (follow
"Former World Champion Collins Receives Eight-Year Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug
Conspiracy" hyperlink under "2004").
111. Id
112. Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 20.
113. WADAANTI-DoPINGCODE,supra note 14, at 12.
114. Collins, AAA No. 301900065804, at 14-15.
115. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19 ( 1976).
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A different approach by the Montgomery Tribunal may well have concluded with
a finding of guilt, while affording Montgomery a fair hearing with appropriate due
116
process. The USADA presented evidence that the Tribunal did not even consider.
A determination based upon the full body of evidence presented would have been a far
wiser path to talce. Such a finding would have been consistent with the Collins Panel's
correct determination that an agency must present a variety of substantiating evidence
to prove an athlete's guilt in non-analytical positive cases. It would also have allowed
the Tribunal to avoid its problematic conclusion that it was on firm footing to draw an
adverse inference from Montgomery's decision not to testify. This alternate path
would have allowed the Tribunal to establish a far better precedent for future nonanalytical positive cases. Instead, as things currently stand, an American athlete can
have an adverse inference drawn from his or her decision not to testify, and be found
guilty of doping solely on evidence of his or her alleged confession.

V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal presiding over Montgomery clearly struggled with the uncharted
waters of a "non-analytical positive" case en route to its creation of a regrettable
procedural blueprint. Future CAS Tribunals should contemplate the following
suggestions as a way to rectify the outcome. First, CAS Tribunals should consider
adopting a criminal burden of proof in non-analytical positive cases because evidence
of an athlete's guilt in these matters is not straightforward as it is in doping cases that
involve an analytical positive. Next, in keeping with this criminal standard, CAS
Tribunals should follow the Collins model and require an agency like the USADA to
present substantial varied evidence to prove an athlete's guilt in non-analytical positive
cases. Finally, CAS Tribunals should stop referring to Olympic doping proceedings
as "civil" and abandon the determination that it is proper to draw an adverse inference
from an American athlete's decision not to testify. Baxter does not establish that an
adverse inference can be drawn in a quasi-criminal proceeding; rather, it allows one
to be drawn in a civil proceeding, and explicitly does not allow one to be drawn in a
criminal one. The WADA has determined that Olympic doping hearings amount to
more than a civil proceeding, and future CAS Tribunals need to recognize this and
acknowledge that the Montgomery Tribunal and the Collins Panel erred by misusing
the holding in Baxter.
If future CAS Tribunals do not implement such changes, and instead stay the
present course in non-analytical positive cases, the CAS will continue to be plagued
by doubts and rumblings from athletes and their lawyers that it more closely resembles
117
a "kangaroo court" than the impartial purveyor of jurisprudence it purports to be.
The perception that athletes are not being given a fair day in court can only persist for
so long before the current system that governs Olympic doping cases fails as an
experiment.

116. See Montgomery, award on merits, CAS 2004/0/645, at 17.
117. See, e.g., Straube!, supra note 42, at 1203. Marion Jones, a three-time gold medalist at the 2000
Sydney Olympics (and former girlfriend of Tim Montgomery), referred to the CAS as a "kangaroo court"
after facing allegations, but never charges, that she was doping in the lead up to the 2004 Athens Olympics.

Id.

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 166 2007

Table 1
Overview of Olympic Doping Adjudication
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Tribunals

Prosecutorial
Agency

Rule-Making
Body

Name

Acronym

Standard of Proof

Comments

Court of Arbitration
for Sport

CAS

•Standard of Proof:
"Comfortable Satisfaction" that
the Quasi-Criminal standard
has been met.

•May draw adverse inference
should Defendant not testify on
own behalf.

North American
Court of Arbitration
for Sport

NAS

United States AntiDoping Agency

USADA

World Anti-Doping
Agency

WADA

-Consider doping cases to be
civil rather than criminal in
nature.

•Standard of Proof:
"Comfortable Satisfaction" that
the Quasi-Criminal standard
has been met.

•NAS decisions are subject to
CAS review.

•Standard of Proof: "QuasiCriminal" burden.

•Burden of proof greater than a
mere balance of probability but
less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

-Created the "Comfortable
Satisfaction" standard of proof
intheWADC.
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0
0

~

~

~

~
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t,

~
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•Wrote World Anti-Doping
Code (WADC) to create
uniformity in doping cases;
adopted by Olympic governing
bodies.
•Monitors compliance with the
WADC and facilitates antidoping efforts worldwide.
•Declared doping cases to be
Quasi-Criminal in nature.
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